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Abstract
This paper provides a set-theoretic model
of knowledge and unawareness, in which
reasoning through theorems is employed.
A new property called Awareness Leads to
Knowledge shows that unawareness of the-
orems not only constrains an agent’s knowl-
edge, but also, can impair his reasoning
about what other agents know. For exam-
ple, in contrast to Li (2006), Heifetz, Meier,
and Schipper (2006) and the standard model
of knowledge, it is possible that two agents
disagree on whether another agent knows a
particular event.
1 INTRODUCTION
A common assumption in economics is that agents
who participate in a model perceive the “world” the
same way the analyst does. This means that they un-
derstand how the model works, they know all the rele-
vant theorems and they do not miss any dimension of
the problem they are facing. In essence, agents are as
educated and as intelligent as the analyst and they can
make the best decision, given their information and
preferences. Modeling unawareness aims at relaxing
this assumption, so that agents may perceive a more
simplified version of the world.
The standard model of knowledge without unaware-
ness was introduced into economics by Aumann
(1976). Its simplicity and the fact that it was purely
set-theoretic led to many economic applications. One
of the first attempts to model unawareness is by
Geanakoplos (1989), using non-partitional informa-
tion structures. However, Dekel, Lipman, and Rusti-
chini (1998) propose three intuitive properties for un-
awareness and show that they are incompatible with
the use of a standard state space.1 On the other hand,
Fagin and Halpern (1988), Halpern (2001), Modica
and Rustichini (1994, 1999) and Halpern and Reˆgo
(2005) construct syntactic models. Two papers that try
to circumvent the problem and provide a set-theoretic
generalization of the standard model are Li (2006)
and Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006). They de-
part from the standard model in that they use multiple
state spaces, one for each state of awareness. Fein-
berg (2004, 2005), Sadzik (2005), Copic and Gale-
otti (2006), Li (2006b), Heifetz, Meier, and Schip-
per (2007), Filiz (2006) and Ozbay (2006) model un-
awareness in the context of games.
This paper provides a model of knowledge and aware-
ness, using multiple state spaces. In order to illustrate
its main difference with the models of Heifetz, Meier,
and Schipper (2006) and Li (2006), consider the fol-
lowing example, depicted in the figure below. There
are two agents, Holmes and Watson, and two relevant
dimensions or questions: “Did the dog bark?” and
“Was there an intruder?”. Holmes is always aware of
both questions, so his subjective state space is the full
state space, containing the four states (ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4)
on the plane. At state ω4 which specifies that there
was no intruder and no barking, Holmes knows that
there is no intruder because he knows that the dog
did not bark and he is also aware of and knows the
1Ely (1998) argues against one of these properties and sug-
gests a one-agent model which employs a standard state space.
Xiong (2007) proposes using the “knowing whether” rather than
the “knowing that” operator and suggests two different unaware-
ness operators that circumvent the impossibility result of Dekel,
Lipman, and Rustichini (1998).
theorem “no barking implies no intruder”.2 Hence,
PH(ω4) = ω4.
Figure 1
Watson is aware only of the question “Was there an
intruder?” and he is unaware of the theorem “no
barking implies no intruder”. His subjective state
space consists of states ω5 and ω6 on the horizon-
tal axis. The property “Projections Preserve Knowl-
edge” in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006) and the
construction in Li (2006) prescribe that when Watson
reasons at ω6 about Holmes’ knowledge, he projects
PH(ω4) = ω4 to his state space. Therefore, he rea-
sons that PH(ω6) = ω6 and that Holmes knows at ω6
that there is no intruder. We argue that this is restric-
tive. Since Watson is unaware of any theorem that
could lead someone to know whether there is an in-
truder, he should not be able to correctly deduce that
Holmes knows at ω6.
In order to accommodate the example so that Watson
reasons that Holmes does not know whether there is
an intruder, we have to abandon projections. Mod-
eling reasoning through theorems does exactly that.
When Watson reasons about Holmes at ω6, he is un-
aware of the theorem “no barking implies no intruder”
and therefore he cannot reason that Holmes is aware
of it. As a result, PH(ω6) = {ω5, ω6} and Watson
reasons that Holmes does not know.3
2That is, he considers ω3 to be impossible. Specifying
PH(ω3) = {ω3} is irrelevant for the example since this state
never occurs.
3One argument against this reasoning is that Watson could be
aware that Holmes is smarter than him, so that he could always
think that Holmes could know, even though Watson cannot de-
scribe exactly how this can happen. But this argument also sug-
The example shows that unawareness can restrict Wat-
son’s reasoning about Holmes’ knowledge about an
event that both are aware of. This is not captured
in other papers that model unawareness. Moreover,
Watson formally makes no mistake. It is true that
with Watson’s awareness, Holmes would not know
that there is no intruder and Watson can reason only
up to his awareness. Essentially, there are two dif-
ferent views of Holmes’ knowledge. This is formally
captured in this model by creating one knowledge op-
erator for each state of awareness. If Watson is aware
of questions V1 then his view of Holmes’ knowledge
is KV1 . But Holmes is aware of more questions, V2,
so his view of Holmes’ knowledge is KV2 .4 The re-
lationship between the two is given by the property
Awareness Leads to Knowledge which states that if V2
contains V1 then KV2 will contain (even strictly) KV1
when both are projected to the same state space. That
is, higher states of awareness give a more complete
description of one’s knowledge. Heifetz, Meier, and
Schipper (2006) specify one knowledge operator K
so that there is always one objective view of Holmes’
knowledge.
One can argue that another way of accommodating
the example is with a model that allows false be-
liefs. Such a (syntactic) model is provided by Halpern
and Reˆgo (2005), who extend that of Heifetz, Meier,
and Schipper (2006). However, allowing false be-
liefs would have stronger implications - that agents
may make mistakes about any event, not just events
which describe other agents’ knowledge. In order to
allow for unawareness of theorems without allowing
for agents to have false beliefs in general, we retain
the truth property but index knowledge, KV , with a
set of questions V .
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces
the basic single-agent model, while its main results are
presented in Section 3. We conclude in Section 4. The
Appendix contains the proofs and the construction of
gests that Watson can never be certain that Holmes does not know
an event. The reason is that Watson can always think that Holmes
is smarter, more aware and therefore could know. But this sug-
gests that in an environment with unawareness an agent can never
be certain that another agent does not know an event, which is
clearly not true.
4In other words, Watson is only aware of the formula “Holmes,
up to awareness V1, knows that there is no intruder”. He is un-
aware of the respective formula when V2 is substituted for V1.
More importantly, the formula “Holmes knows that there is no in-
truder” is not expressed in this model because knowledge, KV , is
always indexed with a set of questions V .
the state space for the multi-agent model.
2 THE MODEL
2.1 PRELIMINARIES
Consider a set of questions Q and denote by Aq the
set of possible answers for question q ∈ Q. The set
Aq can contain one, two, or more answers. The notion
of awareness that will be defined in the following sec-
tions requires that if an agent is aware of a question,
then he is aware of all possible answers. The full state
space Ω∗ is a subset of the Cartesian product ×
q∈Q
Aq.
In the example, the full state space consists of the four
states on the plane, ω1, ω2, ω3 and ω4. Given any set
of questions V ⊆ Q, a subjective state space Ω is the
projection of Ω∗ to the Cartesian product ×
q∈V
Aq . For
instance, Watson’s subjective state space consists of
ω5 and ω6. It is the projection of the full state space
to the question he is aware of. An event E is a sub-
set of a subjective state space Ω (and given Ω∗, there
is a unique subjective state space Ω satisfying this in-
clusion). Define VE to be the unique set of questions
such that E ⊆ Ω ⊆ ×
q∈VE
Aq. If the event is {ω5}, then
V{ω5} is the question “Was there an intruder?”. Define
the negation of E to be the complement of E with re-
spect to the subjective state space Ω of which it is a
subset. Denote the complement of Ω by the empty set
associated with it, ∅VΩ .
Take two sets of questions, V ′ ⊆ V ⊆ Q, and let Ω to
be the subjective state space generated by V , and Ω′ to
be the subjective state space generated by V ′. There
exists a surjective projection ΠVV ′ : Ω → Ω′. For any
subjective state ω ∈ Ω, ΠVV ′(ω) is the restriction of ω
to the smaller set of questions V ′. For instance, the
restriction of ω2 to Watson’s state space is ω6. For an
event E ⊆ Ω, its restriction to V ′ is ΠVV ′(E). Its en-
largement to the bigger set of questions V ′′ is denoted
by (ΠV ′′V )−1(E). The restriction of {ω2, ω3} is the
event {ω5, ω6} while the enlargement of {ω5, ω6} is
{ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4}. To save on notation and only when
it is unambiguous of which state space E is a subset,
we abbreviate restrictions and enlargements by EV ′
and EV ′′ , respectively.
2.2 THE FULL STATE SPACE
For a subset of questions V ⊆ Q0, where Q0 is the
set of basic questions, the resulting Cartesian prod-
uct of their answers is ×
q∈V
Aq .
5 Define mV to be the
question “What subjective states in ×
q∈V
Aq does the
agent consider impossible?”. The collection of possi-
ble answers for question mV is the collection of all
proper subsets of ×
q∈V
Aq. The questions mV capture
the agent’s knowledge of theorems, as shown in Sec-
tion 2.4.
For each question q, where q ∈ Q0, or q = mV ,
for V ⊆ Q0, define aq to be the question “Is the
agent aware of question q?”. This question captures
the agent’s awareness of questions, as shown in Sec-
tion 2.3. In a multi-agent model, it will also capture
the agent’s knowledge about each agent’s awareness.
The possible answers for this type of questions are just
two: “yes” and “no”. Questions of the type aaq, aaaq,
aa . . . aq are not defined. Justification for this restric-
tion will be given in Section 2.3, where awareness of
questions will be defined.
The set of all questions Q contains the basic questions
Q0, together with the epistemic questions of the type
mV , where V ⊆ Q0, and of the type aq, where q ∈
Q0, or q = mV , for V ⊆ Q0. The full state space
Ω∗ is a subset of the Cartesian product of the answers
of all questions in Q: Ω∗ ⊆ ×
q∈Q
Aq. Define S to be
the union of all state spaces: S =
⋃
{ΠQV (Ω
∗) : ∅ 6=
V ⊆ Q}. The construction of the full state space in
the multi-agent case is more complicated, as an agent
has to reason about other agents’ reasoning as well.
The details are given in the appendix.
2.3 AWARENESS
The awareness of an agent is given by W , which is
a mapping from S to sets of questions. For any state
ω ∈ S ,
W (ω) =
⋃{
{q, aq} ⊆ V{ω} : ωaq = “yes”
}
denotes the questions, of which the agent is aware if
ω ∈ S occurs. If ω specifies “yes” to question aq,
then the agent is aware of question q at ω. We then as-
sume that he is also aware of question aq. Questions
5The basic questions describe the physical world but not the
agents’ knowledge or awareness.
of the type aaq, aaaq, aa . . . aq are not permitted by
the model. The first reason for this restriction stems
for the definition of W , which specifies that the agent
is aware of q and aq if ω specifies “yes” to question
aq. Therefore, question aaq, which would also spec-
ify whether the agent is aware of question aq, is not
needed. Another reason why these higher orders of
questions would seem necessary is to express that if an
agent is aware of something, then he is aware that he is
aware of it. One of the results of Theorem 2 is exactly
this property and it does not require these higher order
questions. In the multi-agent case however, questions
of the type aiajakq where i 6= j and j 6= k arise nat-
urally when common knowledge is defined and thus
will be included in the formal model. The agent’s sub-
jective state space at ω ∈ S is Ω(ω) = Ω∗
W (ω), which
is the projection of the full state space Ω∗ to the set of
questions he is aware of at ω.6
Take an eventE and define U(E) to be the set of states
ω ∈ S that describe that the agent is unaware of it:
U(E) = {ω ∈ S : VE *W (ω)} .
The agent is unaware of event E if he is not aware of
all questions VE that generate this event.
Given a set of questions V that generate the state space
Ω∗V , we define UV (E) = Ω∗V ∩ U(E) to be the states
of that particular state space, which describe that the
agent is unaware of E. Hence, UV (E) ⊆ Ω∗V is an
event. Denote the complement of UV (E) by AV (E).
It is natural to require that V be big enough so that
the generated state space Ω∗V can adequately express
E and the agent’s awareness of it. Hence, we first re-
quire that V should contain all questions in VE . Sec-
ondly, we require that for each question q ∈ VE , V
contains its respective counterpart aq. Denote this set
of questions by α(VE).7 Then, the condition is that
VE ∪ α(VE) ⊆ V .
2.4 THEOREMS AND IMPOSSIBLE STATES
A theorem of the form “A implies B” can equivalently
be expressed as the impossibility of the state that spec-
ifies “A is true but B is false”. The agent’s knowledge
6If W (ω) = ∅, then define Ω(ω) = ∅. In that case, Ω(ω) is
not an event and carries no awareness.
7The respective counterpart of aq is aq itself, since question
aaq is not allowed in the model. Formally, for any V ⊆ Q,
α(V ) = {aq : q ∈ V, q 6= aq′ for all q′ ∈ Q}
S
{q ∈ V :
q = aq′, q′ ∈ Q}.
of theorems is given by the function M , which maps
S to subsets of S . For any ω ∈ S ,
M(ω) = {ω′ ∈ Ω(ω) :
{ω′}V ∈ ωmV , {mV } ∪ V ⊆W (ω)}
denotes the set of subjective states that the agent con-
siders impossible at ω, and expresses what theorems
he knows at that state. An element ω′ ∈ Ω(ω) of
the agent’s state space at ω is considered impossible
if two conditions are met. Firstly, at ω the agent is
aware of question mV and all questions in V . That
is, he can formulate the Cartesian product ×
q∈V
Aq and
ask the question mV : “What states in ×
q∈V
Aq does the
agent consider impossible?”. Secondly, the projection
of ω′ to the set of questions V is contained in ωmV ,
which is the answer that ω specifies for question mV .
This answer, ωmV , is an event, a subset of the Carte-
sian product ×
q∈V
Aq .
2.5 IMMEDIATE PERCEPTION
It is assumed that for some questions q ∈ Q that the
agent is aware of, he always knows the answer. For
example, questions that describe what the agent sees
or hears. Denote by X the set of all such questions.
The following axiom is assumed throughout the paper.
Define E to be the set that contains all epistemic ques-
tions aq ∈ Q for q ∈ Q and anymV ∈ Q, for V ⊆ Q:
E = {aq ∈ Q : q ∈ Q} ∪ {mV ∈ Q : V ⊆ Q}.
Axiom 1. E ⊆ X.
The axiom states that X contains at least all the epis-
temic questions that belong to Q.
2.6 POSSIBILITY AND KNOWLEDGE
For any ω ∈ S ,
P (ω) = {ω′ ∈ Ω(ω) :
ω′q = ωq, q ∈W (ω) ∩X} \M(ω)
denotes the subjective states the agent considers pos-
sible if ω occurs. More specifically, at ω the agent is
aware of questions that belong to W (ω) and his sub-
jective state space is Ω(ω). For the questions inW (ω)
that also belong toX, he knows the answer. This is the
answer that ω specifies for that question. For all other
questions in W (ω) he does not know the answer, but
he can utilize his knowledge of theorems by exclud-
ing the impossible states M(ω). The following axiom
states that the agent never excludes the true state.
Axiom 2. For all ω∗ ∈ Ω∗, {ω∗}W (ω∗) ∈ P (ω∗).
Axiom 2 implies that for all ω ∈ S such that W (ω) 6=
∅, {ω}W (ω) ∈ P (ω).
Take an event E and define K(E) to be the set of
states ω ∈ S that describe that the agent knows E:
K(E) = {ω ∈ S : VE ⊆W (ω) and (P (ω))VE ⊆ E} .
The agent knows E if he is aware of it and in all the
states he considers possible, it obtains. Given a set of
questions V that generate state space Ω∗V , we define
KV (E) = Ω
∗
V ∩K(E) to be the event of that partic-
ular state space, which describes that the agent knows
E.8
3 RESULTS
The following Theorem generalizes properties
P1, P2 and P3 of the standard model without
unawareness. All the results of this section are valid
for the multi-agent case as well.
Theorem 1.
1. {ω}W (ω) /∈M(ω) ⇐⇒ {ω}W (ω) ∈ P (ω).9
2. ω′ ∈ P (ω) implies P (ω′) = P (ω).
The next property is the most important departure
from other models dealing with unawareness, and
stems from the explicit use of reasoning through the-
orems in the construction.
Property 1. Awareness Leads to Knowledge
Suppose axiom 2 holds. For any event E, if VE ∪
α(VE) ⊆ V2 ⊆ V1, then
• KV2(E) ⊆ (KV1(E))V2 and
• KV2(E) ⊇ (KV1(E))V2 is not necessarily true.
8As with the unawareness operator UV (E), we impose the
restriction VE ∪ α(VE) ⊆ V .
9 The following property is also true. Suppose M ⊆ Ω∗V is
a set of impossible states, ω ∈ Ω∗V , ω /∈ M and M(ω)V ⊆ M .
Then {ω}W (ω) ∈ P (ω).
The condition VE ∪ α(VE) ⊆ V2, V1 ensures that the
state spaces generated by V1 and V2 are rich enough to
describe the agent’s knowledge of E, so that KV2(E),
KV1(E) are well defined, as explained in Section 2.6.
The condition V2 ⊆ V1 says that the state space gen-
erated by questions V1 is richer than that generated
by questions V2. The property then states that state
spaces which are generated by more questions give a
more complete description of the agent’s knowledge
of an event E. In other words, if a more complete
description of the world ω specifies that the agent
knows event E, (ω ∈ KV1(E)), the less complete de-
scription {ω}V2 may specify that he does not know it
({ω}V2 /∈ KV2(E)).
The next theorem verifies properties that have been
proposed in the literature, or are generalizations of
properties of the standard model.
Theorem 2. Suppose VE ∪ α(VE) ∪ VF ∪ α(VF ) ∪
α(V ) ⊆ V . Then:
1. Subjective Necessitation Suppose axiom 2
holds. Then, for all ω ∈ Ω∗V , ω ∈ KV (Ω(ω)).
2. Generalized Monotonicity EVE∪VF ⊆
FVE∪VF , VF ⊆ VE =⇒ KV (E) ⊆ KV (F ).
3. Conjunction KV (E) ∩ KV (F ) =
KV (EVE∪VF ∩ FVE∪VF ).
4. The Axiom of Knowledge Suppose axiom 2
holds. Then, KV (E) ⊆ EV .
5. The Axiom of Transparency ω ∈ KV (E) ⇐⇒
ω ∈ KV (KW (ω)(E)).
6. The Axiom of Wisdom Suppose axiom 2 holds.
Then, ω ∈ AV (E) ∩ ¬KV (E) ⇐⇒ ω ∈
KV (AW (ω)(E) ∩ ¬KW (ω)(E)).
7. Plausibility UV (E) ⊆ ¬KV (E) ∩
¬KV (¬KV (E)).
8. Strong Plausibility UV (E) ⊆
¬KV (E) ∩ ¬KV (¬KV (E)) ∩ . . . ∩
¬KV (¬KV (. . .¬KV (E))).
9. AU Introspection UV (E) ⊆ UV (UV (E)).
10. KU Introspection KV (UV (E)) = ∅V .
11. Symmetry UV (E) = UV (¬E).
12. AA-Self Reflection ω ∈ AV (E) ⇐⇒ ω ∈
AV (AW (ω)(E)).
13. AK-Self Reflection ω ∈ AV (E) ⇐⇒ ω ∈
AV (KW (ω)(E)).
14. A-Introspection Suppose axiom 2 holds. Then,
ω ∈ AV (E) ⇐⇒ ω ∈ KV (AW (ω)(E)).
The condition VE∪α(VE)∪VF ∪α(VF )∪α(V ) ⊆ V
only ensures that the events UV (E), KV (E), UV (F ),
KV (F ), and UV (UV (E)) are well defined. The first
six properties are generalizations of the six proper-
ties of the standard model. Some of these generaliza-
tions are proposed by Li (2006). Plausibility, Strong
Plausibility, AU Introspection and KU Introspection
are the properties used by Dekel, Lipman, and Rusti-
chini (1998) to show that unawareness precludes the
use of a standard state space. Symmetry, AA-Self Re-
flection, AK-Self Reflection and A-Introspection have
been proposed by Modica and Rustichini (1999) and
Halpern (2001).
4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we argue that with unawareness of theo-
rems it is possible that two agents disagree on whether
a third agent knows a particular event. This disagree-
ment does not arise because agents make logical mis-
takes or have false beliefs but because they have dif-
ferent awareness, which implies that they reason dif-
ferently about the knowledge of others. The idea
that differences in awareness may specify different
views of one’s knowledge is captured by formulating,
for each state of awareness V , a knowledge operator
KV . The relation between knowledge expressed with
awareness V and knowledge expressed with aware-
ness V ′ is captured by the property Awareness Leads
to Knowledge. These connections between aware-
ness and knowledge are not accommodated in Heifetz,
Meier, and Schipper (2006) and Li (2006). In particu-
lar, Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006) specify an ob-
jective knowledge operator K, so that there can never
be two different views of one’s knowledge, because of
differences in awareness.
In a companion work we show that unawareness of
theorems has interesting implications. In particular,
one of the results of the standard model of knowledge
is that asymmetric information alone cannot explain
trade. Using the multi-agent version of this model
we show that asymmetric information due to asym-
metric awareness can allow for trade. The literature
on no-trade theorems stems from the result of Au-
mann (1976) that if agents have common priors and
their posteriors about an event are common knowl-
edge, then these posteriors must be identical. It is
shown that in an environment with unawareness the
same result is true only for common priors and poste-
riors which are defined on a “common” state space,
which is the state space that not only everyone is
aware of, but it is also common knowledge that ev-
eryone is aware of. However, as the property Aware-
ness Leads to Knowledge suggests, state spaces which
carry more awareness give a more complete descrip-
tion of one’s knowledge and posteriors. In an example
with two agents we show that although the posteriors
defined on this “common” state space are common
knowledge and therefore identical, there still can be
trade because one agent’s higher awareness implies
that his actual posterior is different and beyond the
other agent’s reasoning. Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper
(2006, 2007) also provide examples where trade takes
place. Comparison between the different approaches
is provided in the companion work.
A Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1.
1(a). The proof is immediate from the definition of
P (ω).
1(b). For footnote 9 we have that ω /∈ M =⇒
ω /∈ (ΠV
W (ω))
−1(M(ω)) =⇒ ΠV
W (ω)(ω) /∈
M(ω) =⇒ ΠV
W (ω)(ω) ∈ P (ω).
2. First, we prove the following proposition.
Proposition 1. ω ∈ P (ω1) implies
i) W (ω1) =W (ω).
ii) M(ω1) =M(ω).
Proof.
i) Suppose q ∈ W (ω1). There are two cases.
Either q 6= aq′ for any q′ ∈ Q, or q = aq′
for some q′ ∈ Q. In the first case, we
have that ω1aq = “yes” and aq ∈ W (ω1).
In the second case, ω1aq′ = “yes” and
aq′ ∈ W (ω1). The proof is identical in
both cases, so we just illustrate the first case.
From axiom 1, aq ∈ X ∩ W (ω1). Since
ω ∈ P (ω1), we have ωaq = “yes”, which,
together with {q, aq} ⊆ W (ω1) = Vω im-
plies {q, aq} ⊆ W (ω). The other direction
is immediate since Vω =W (ω1).
ii) Suppose ω2 ∈ M(ω1). Then, there exist
{mV }, V such that {mV } ∪ V ⊆ W (ω1)
and ΠW (ω1)V (ω2) ∈ ω1mV . From i) we have
W (ω1) = W (ω), which implies {mV } ∪
V ⊆ W (ω). Moreover, from axiom 1 we
have that mV ∈ X ∩W (ω1). Thus, ω ∈
P (ω1) implies ωmV = ω1mV and therefore
ω2 ∈ M(ω). The other direction is identi-
cal.
Sets P (ω1) and P (ω) are repeated below:
P (ω1) = {ω2 ∈ Ω(ω1) :
ω2q = ω1q, q ∈W (ω1) ∩X} \M(ω1),
P (ω) = {ω2 ∈ Ω(ω) :
ω2q = ωq, q ∈W (ω) ∩X} \M(ω).
From Proposition 1 we have W (ω1) = W (ω)
and M(ω1) = M(ω). Since ω ∈ P (ω1) implies
that ωq = ω1q for all q ∈W (ω1)∩X =W (ω)∩
X, we have that P (ω1) = P (ω).
Proof of Property 1.
First we prove that if V2 ⊆ V1, then (KV2(E))V1 ⊆
KV1(E). Suppose ω ∈ (KV2(E))V1 . Then, {ω}V2 ∈
KV2(E), which implies that ∅ 6= P ({ω}V2) ⊆
EW ({ω}V2 ) and VE ⊆ W ({ω}V2). We have to show
that VE ⊆ W (ω) and ∅ 6= P (ω) ⊆ EW (ω). Firstly,
since V2 ⊆ V1 we also have W ({ω}V2) ⊆ W (ω).
Therefore, VE ⊆ W (ω). Non emptiness of P (ω) is
guaranteed by axiom 2.
We next show that (P (ω))W ({ω}V2 ) ⊆ P ({ω}V2).
Suppose that ω′ ∈ (P (ω))W ({ω}V2 ). Then, there ex-
ists ω1 ∈ P (ω) such that {ω1}W ({ω}V2 ) = ω
′
. More-
over, ω1 ∈ P (ω) implies that ω1q = ωq for all q ∈
W (ω)∩X, hence ω′q = ωq for all q ∈W ({ω}V2)∩X.
Next, we need to show that ω′ /∈ M({ω}V2). Sup-
pose that ω′ ∈ M({ω}V2). Then, there exist V
and mV such that V ∪ {mV } ⊆ W ({ω}V2) and
{ω′}V ∈ ωmV . Since {ω1}W ({ω}V2 ) = ω
′ and
V ∪ {mV } ⊆ W ({ω}V2) ⊆ W (ω), we have that
{ω1}V ∈ ωmV , which implies that ω1 ∈ M(ω) and
ω1 /∈ P (ω), a contradiction. Hence, ω′ /∈ M({ω}V2)
and ω′ ∈ P ({ω}V2).
We have shown that (P (ω))W ({ω}V2 ) ⊆ P ({ω}V2) ⊆
EW ({ω}V2 ), and VE ⊆ W ({ω}V2) ⊆ W (ω).
Therefore, P (ω) ⊆ EW (ω), which implies that
(KV2(E))V1 ⊆ KV1(E). Finally, since V2 ⊆ V1, we
also have thatKV2(E) ⊆ (KV1(E))V2 . For the second
bullet, a counter example is provided in the Holmes
and Watson example.
Proof of Theorem 2.
1. Subjective Necessitation First, note
that KV (Ω(ω)) is well defined becasue
W (ω) ∪ α(W (ω)) ⊆ V . Subjective necessi-
tation then follows from VΩ(ω) = W (ω) and
∅ 6= P (ω) ⊆ Ω(ω).
2. Generalized Monotonicity Suppose ω ∈
KV (E). Then, VE ⊆ W (ω) and ∅ 6= P (ω) ⊆
EW (ω). Also, VF ⊆ W (ω) which implies that
EW (ω) ⊆ FW (ω). Therefore, ω ∈ KV (F ).
3. Conjunction We have that VE ⊆ W (ω) and
VF ⊆ W (ω) if and only if VE ∪ VF ⊆ W (ω).
Also, ∅ 6= P (ω) ⊆ EW (ω) and ∅ 6= P (ω) ⊆
FW (ω) if and only if ∅ 6= P (ω) ⊆ EW (ω) ∩
FW (ω) = (EVE∪VF ∩ FVE∪VF )W (ω). The lat-
ter equality follows because ω1 ∈ (EVE∪VF ∩
FVE∪VF )W (ω) ⇐⇒ {ω1}VE∪VF ∈ EVE∪VF ∩
FVE∪VF ⇐⇒ ω1 ∈ EW (ω) ∩ FW (ω).
4. The Axiom of Knowledge ω ∈ KV (E) implies
VE ⊆ W (ω) and ∅ 6= P (ω) ⊆ EW (ω). Axiom
2 implies {ω}W (ω) ∈ P (ω). Hence, {ω}W (ω) ∈
EW (ω), which implies ω ∈ EV .
5. The Axiom of Transparency Suppose ω ∈
KV (E). Then, VE ∪ α(VE) ⊆ W (ω) and
∅ 6= P (ω) ⊆ EW (ω). We have to show that
∅ 6= P (ω) ⊆ KW (ω)(E), or that ω1 ∈ P (ω) im-
plies VE ⊆ W (ω1) and ∅ 6= P (ω1) ⊆ EW (ω1).
From Proposition 1, we have that ω1 ∈ P (ω) im-
plies W (ω1) = W (ω). Hence, VE ⊆ W (ω1) =
W (ω). From Theorem 1 we have that ω1 ∈
P (ω) implies P (ω) = P (ω1). Thus, ∅ 6=
P (ω1) ⊆ EW (ω) = EW (ω1).
Suppose ω ∈ KV KW (ω)(E), which implies that
∅ 6= P (ω) ⊆ KW (ω)(E). Hence, for all ω1 ∈
P (ω), we have that ω1 ∈ KW (ω)(E), W (ω) =
W (ω1), P (ω) = P (ω1) and ∅ 6= P (ω1) ⊆
EW (ω). Therefore, ∅ 6= P (ω) ⊆ EW (ω) and
ω ∈ KV (E).
6. The Axiom of Wisdom Suppose ω ∈ AV (E) ∩
¬KV (E). Then, VE ∪ α(VE) ⊆ W (ω) and ei-
ther P (ω) = ∅ or ∅ 6= P (ω) * EW (ω). Ax-
iom 2 implies that P (ω) 6= ∅, so we just have to
show that P (ω) ⊆ AW (ω)(E) ∩ ¬KW (ω)(E).
Suppose ω1 ∈ P (ω). Proposition 1 implies
that W (ω1) = W (ω). Hence, VE ⊆ W (ω1)
and ω1 ∈ AW (ω)(E). Theorem 1 implies that
P (ω) = P (ω1). Thus P (ω1) * EW (ω) =
EW (ω1) and ω1 ∈ ¬KW (ω)(E).
Suppose ω ∈ KV (AW (ω)∩¬KW (ω)(E)). Then,
∅ 6= P (ω) ⊆ AW (ω) ∩ ¬KW (ω)(E). Since
AW (ω)(E) is defined only if VE ∪ α(VE) ⊆
W (ω), we have that ω ∈ AV (E). It remains
to show that ω ∈ ¬KV (E), or that P (ω) *
EW (ω). We know that for all ω1 ∈ P (ω),
ω1 ∈ ¬KW (ω)(E), which implies that P (ω1) *
EW (ω). Since P (ω) = P (ω1), we have that
P (ω) * EW (ω).
8. Strong Plausibility By assumption, VE ⊆
V = V¬KV (E) = V¬KV (¬KV (E)) =
V¬KV (¬KV (...¬KV (E))). Suppose ω ∈ UV (E).
Then, VE * W (ω) and therefore V * W (ω).
Hence, ω ∈ ¬KV (E)∩¬KV (¬KV (E))∩ . . .∩
¬KV (¬KV (. . .¬KV (E))).
9. AU Introspection Suppose ω ∈ UV (E), Then,
VE * W (ω) and since VE ⊆ V = VUV (E),
we have VUV (E) * W (ω), which implies ω ∈
UV (UV (E)).
10. KU Introspection Suppose ω ∈ KV (UV (E)).
Then, W (ω) = V and there exists ω1 ∈
P (ω) ⊆ UV (E). From Proposition 1 we have
that W (ω1) = W (ω) = V . Moreover, the def-
inition of UV (E) implies that VE ⊆ V . There-
fore, VE ⊆ W (ω1). But ω1 ∈ UV (E) implies
that VE *W (ω1), a contradiction.
11. Symmetry Follows from VE = V¬E .
12. AA-Self Reflection ω ∈ AV (E) impliesW (ω)∪
α(W (ω)) ⊆ V and VE ∪ α(VE) ⊆ W (ω).
Therefore, AV (AW (ω)(E)) is well defined and
ω ∈ AV (AW (ω)(E)). For the other direc-
tion, suppose that ω ∈ AV (AW (ω)(E)). Since
AW (ω)(E) is defined only if VE ∪ α(VE) ⊆
W (ω), we have that ω ∈ AV (E).
13. AK-Self Reflection The proof is similar.
14. A-Introspection Suppose ω ∈ AV (E). Then,
VE ∪ α(VE) ⊆ W (ω) ⊆ V and W (ω) =
VAW (ω)(E), so we just have to show that ∅ 6=
P (ω) ⊆ AW (ω)(E). That P (ω) is non empty
follows from axiom 2. Suppose that ω1 ∈
P (ω). From Proposition 1, we have W (ω) =
W (ω1) which implies VE ⊆ W (ω1) and ω1 ∈
AW (ω)(E). For the other direction, suppose that
ω ∈ KV (AW (ω)(E)). This implies that ω ∈
AV (AW (ω)(E)) and ω ∈ AV (E) follows from
AA-Self Reflection.
A.1 THE FULL STATE SPACE
This section gives a detailed construction of the full
state space, which is the state space of the analyst or
of a fully aware agent. The construction is similar to
that of a beliefs space: starting from an initial state
space S, define each player’s first order beliefs on S,
then each player’s second order beliefs on S and all
other players first order beliefs, and so on. The dif-
ference with this formulation is that instead of beliefs
we have the epistemic questions aiq and miV , that
describe the awareness of questions and knowledge of
theorems for each agent i.
For any state space Ω = ×
q∈V
Aq, let E i(Ω) be the set
of epistemic questions of agent i about Ω. This set
will consist of questions of the type aiq and miV . In
particular, suppose Ω = ×
q∈V
Aq is generated from a
set of questions V . The set of all questions of the type
miV1, for all nonempty subsets V1 of V is
{
miV1 : ∅ 6= V1 ⊆ V
}
. (1)
These questions represent all the theorems that agent
i can potentially have about state space Ω.
The set
{
aiq : q ∈ V ∪
{
miV1 : ∅ 6= V1 ⊆ V
}} (2)
contains all the aiq questions, for all questions in V
and in {miV1 : ∅ 6= V1 ⊆ V }. Denote the union
of the two sets of questions in (1) and (2) by E i(Ω).
An element that gives an answer to all questions in
E i(Ω) describes agent i’s awareness of questions and
knowledge of theorems, about state space Ω.
To construct the full state space Ω∗, we begin with an
initial state space S = ×
q∈Q0
Aq , which is generated
from a finite or countably infinite set of basic ques-
tions Q0. A state of nature s ∈ S gives a detailed de-
scription of the world, but not what agents are aware
of or know. Let Ωi1 = S be agent i’s first order state
space. Questions in E i(Ωi1) describe agent i’s aware-
ness of questions and knowledge of theorems about
state space Ωi1. Define the set of all combinations of
answers for these questions to be T i1:
T i1 = ×
q∈Ei(Ω1)
Aq,
which we interpret as the first order type of agent i.
The second order state space for agent i is
Ωi2 = S ×
j 6=i
T j1 .
An element in Ωi2 describes the state of nature s ∈ S,
together with the awareness of questions and knowl-
edge of theorems about S, for all agents besides i.
The set E i(Ωi2) contains all the epistemic questions of
agent i about state space Ωi2. Note that there are some
questions in E i(Ωi2) that also belong to E i(Ωi1). For
example, if q is a basic question and belongs to Q0,
then aiq belongs to E i(Ωi1) ∩ E i(Ωi2). To avoid any
duplication of questions, we define the second order
type of agent i to be
T i2 = ×
q∈Ei(Ωi2)\E
i(Ωi1)
Aq.
An element in T i1×T i2 specifies the questions the agent
is aware of and the theorems he knows in state space
Ωi2. Accordingly, the third order state space of agent i
is
Ωi3 = Ω
i
2 ×
j 6=i
T j2 .
Continuing inductively, we define for all k ≥ 1,
Ωik+1 = Ω
i
k ×
j 6=i
T jk ,
T ik+1 = ×
q∈Ei(Ωi
k+1)\E
i(Ωi
k
)
Aq.
Note that T ik+1 is non-empty for all k, as new epis-
temic questions are created in each step. Define T i
to be the Cartesian product
∞
×
n=1
T in. An element in T i
contains an answer for all epistemic questions about
agent i. In particular, it gives an answer to only ques-
tions of the type aiq, or of the type miV , where q
can be either a basic question or an epistemic ques-
tion about another agent (e.g. q = ajakaiq′), while
V can contain both basic and epistemic questions
for all other agents. Note that questions of the type
aiai . . . aiq are not created. Summarizing, an element
in T i describes agent i’s awareness of questions and
knowledge of theorems for each successively bigger
state space Ωk, where k ≥ 1.
Interpreting T i as the set of all types for agent i, we
can define a full state to specify a state of nature s ∈
S, together with a type for each player i ∈ I . The full
state space Ω∗ is then a subset of the Cartesian product
S ×
i∈I
T i:
Ω∗ ⊆ S ×
i∈I
T i.
The set of all questions that generate the full state
space Ω∗ is denoted by Q. Formally, VΩ∗ = Q and
Ω∗ ⊆ ×
q∈Q
Aq.
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